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MANAGING AFRICA’S NATURAL RESOURCE




Managing a nation’s extractive natural resource endowments can advance
national development if done meaningfully. Unfortunately, across Africa, the
apparent mismanagement of such resources, poor growth rates, social tensions,
and civil strife in resource-rich countries have thrown up a great deal of
literature on what is now known as resource curse.It has also ignited calls for
enhanced governance and improved capacities for the myriad of actors engaged
in natural resource extraction. This article draws on the extant literature to
interrogate the complex entanglements of issues involved in the natural
resource value chain in Africa. It argues that in spite of the general ills,
economic challenges, and socio-political pains that resource-rich African
nations face in exploiting and managing their natural resources, the extractive
industry in Africa is evolving positively, and that the situation of resource-rich
African states is not immutable. Available evidence suggests that Africa is
emerging a new, more complex, participatory, and coordinated vision of NRM;
a development that offers opportunities and possibilities for Africa to engage
emerging actors especially in the global South.The article concludes that
what Africa needs is an approach with a good fit to local realities, and an
enhancement of individual and institutional capacities.




Africa’s vast natural resources can spur development if managed properly.
However, as experience shows, resource exploitation does not
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automatically translate into meaningful development. Across the
continent, the exploitation and role of renewable (land, forests, water)
and non-renewable natural resources – oil, gas and minerals such as
copper, gold, coal, etc. – has, unfortunately, been central to the geo-
political, social and armed struggles.1 Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) immediately come to mind. Land
grabs in Tanzania, Madagascar, DRC, and Ethiopia, to name a few, are
also well documented. Again, the pollution of indigenous peoples lands
in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the political unrest in Madagascar
due to popular protest over the unfavourable land deals with South
Korea, are well documented.
The terms resource curse, paradox of plenty and Dutch disease, are
particular manifestations of the aforementioned negative relationship
and, refer to forms of erosion of the broader economy.2 For example,
the relationship between the rise in the exploitation of natural resources
and a decline in the manufacturing sector (at times to include emergent
industrial agriculture) reveals that comparatively greater revenues from
natural resources can deindustrialize a national economy by raising
the exchange rate, thus making the manufacturing sector less
competitive.3
According to Karl,4 the resource curse or the paradox of plenty is
explained by the fact that many of the oil-producing countries or petro-
states are more dependent than other states on a single non-renewable
commodity, and the exploitation of that commodity is more capital
intensive, more enclave oriented, more centralized in the state, and
more rent producing than any other, all of which bode ill for successful
development. Revenue flowing through incapable or corrupt structures
would have negative and perverse consequences on a country because
1 UNDP. Managing Natural Resources for Human Development in Low-Income
Countries (Washington D.C.: UNDP – Regional Bureau for Africa, 2011).
2 Barma, N.H., K. Kaiser, T.M. Le and L. Viñuela. Rents to Riches: The Political
Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development (Washington D.C.: World Bank,
2012), see alsoHumphreys, M., Sachs, J.D. and Stiglitz, J.E.  Escaping the Resource
Curse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
3 Corden, W. and Neary, J. P.  “Booming Sector and Deindustrialization in a Small
Open Economy” (1982), Economic Journal, 92, 368: 825-848, see also Javaid,
S.H. “Dutch Disease Investigated: Empirical Evidence from Selected South East
Asian Economies” (2011), Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development,
32, 4: 61-74.
4 Karl, T. L. “The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty”
(1999) Journal of International Affairs, 53, 1:31-48.
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the money was put to bad use, encouraged dependence on natural
resources, and tended to result in corruption and a mono-industry
economy. In particular, oil exports inflated the value of a country’s
currency and made its other exports uncompetitive.
In sum, natural resource extraction created and solidified
asymmetries in wealth and increased the income gaps between the
rich and poor; this, in turn, contributed to the institutionalization of
corruption and enabled oppressive regimes to maintain their political
power.5 This is a particular problem for resource-rich African economies
which do not have a mature manufacturing sector able to withstand
such a process, thus making them quite vulnerable to shocks. Indeed,
poor growth rates, high inequality, social exclusion, impoverishment,
poor governance, environmental concerns, social tensions, and civil
strife characterize many resource-rich countries across Africa.6
Despite the evidence in the literature, and obvious challenges to
the effective management of natural resources, some of the claims of
the resource curse theorists have been challenged recently7 because
the resource-conflict link is probably more complex than is conceptua-
lized in the scientific mainstream. Others notice a considerable room
for human agency to correct the risks posed by the paradox of plenty.8
Specifically for Africa, it has been argued that the resource curse
paradigm hides the larger question of how institutions and their
transformation affect growth.9 The importance of institutions derives
from their offeringa structure required for the effective interaction of political
and economic relations, or what North10 calls “the rules of the game”.
5 Karl, T. L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1997).
6 Barma et al (n.2), see also Humphreys et al (n.2); Collier, P. The Bottom Billion:
Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007).
7 Obi, C. “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil-
Rich Niger Delta” (2010), Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 30 (1-2):
219-236.
8 Humphreys et al (n.2); Barma et al (n.2).
9 Hanson, K.T., D’Alessandro, C., and Owusu, F. (eds.). Managing Africa’s Natural
Resources: Capacities for Development (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014), see also ACBF (African Capacity Building Foundation).  Africa
Capacity Building Indicators 2013: Capacity Development for Natural Resource
Management (Harare: ACBF, 2013).
10 North, D.C.  Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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In Africa, as indeed in many nations across the global South,
discussions of the institutional structure inevitably lead to the state
and its institutional apparatus in the development framework.11
Observably, the role of the contemporary African state in the
development process has undergone dramatic changes due to or in
response to globalization. The contestation suggests that policy
outcomes are not predetermined, but rather contingent on the
complexities in the relationship between state and non-state actors
and institutions. It is for this reason that Basedau12 argues that
contextual variables encompassing the national level must be taken
into account in explaining why natural resources are sometimes
detrimental to the development of a nation.
Such criticisms against the resource curse theorists shifted the initial
debates to issues related to capacity, leadership, and governance, as
the key drivers to negotiating the previously well-documented
challenges of the natural resource sector.13 Thus, negotiating the curse
is “inherently a governance challenge: the credibility, quality,
transparency, and accountability of policy-making processes, public
institutions, the legal and regulatory climate, and sector governance
are major determinants of how successfully countries can channel their
resource wealth into sustainable development.”14
The resource curse thesis can, and should, be criticized on the
grounds of its “evaluation methodologies and on the basis of
measurement errors, incorrect specification of the models and the high
probability of spurious correlations.”15 It will, at the same time, be
hypocritical to ignore the general ills, economic challenges, and socio-
political pains that resource-rich African nations face in exploiting and
11 Puplampu, K.P. “The Capacity Question, Leadership and Strategic Choices:
Environmental Sustainability and Natural Resources Management in Africa”
(2014). In Hanson et al. (eds.) (n. 9); see also Haslam, P. A., Schafer, J. and
P. Beaudet. (eds.) Introduction to International Development:  Approaches, Actors
and Issues (2nd Edition. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2012).
12 Basedau, M. “Context Matters – Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan
Africa” (DUI Working Papers #1), (Hamburg: German Overseas Institute,
2005).
13 Hanson et al (n.9), see also ACBF (n.10).
14 Barma et al (n.2), 4.
15 UNRISD. “Report of the UNRISD International Workshop” (March 1-2, 2007),
UNRISD Conference News.
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managing their natural resources. In fact, as Besada16 puts it, the
historical and contemporary records of many resource-dependent
African nations justify the concerns that have been evoked in the
resource curse discussions.
The aforementioned notwithstanding, Africa’s perceived resource
curse is not inexorable.17 Some countries have been able to effectively
manage their natural resources to spur development (e.g., Botswana),
while others have recently revised/renegotiated contracts to ensure
better outcomes (e.g., Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone). Early in
her administrationin Liberia, President Johnson Sirleaf ended decades
of poorly managed extraction of timber resources by issuing Executive
Order No. 1, declaring all forest concessions null and void and assigning
the Forestry Development Authority (FDA), together with the Liberia
Forest Initiative, with supervision of the reform process of the forest
sector.18 In Mozambique, after an audit of investments between 2002
and 2008, the National Directorate of Lands and Forests cancelled or
reduced the land area of 1500 investor contracts due to non-compliance
with their investment plan.19 As these cases demonstrate, there is still
agency at the national level for change, monitoring and holding
accountable investors that fail to comply with their contracts.
Observably the national level can often lack the knowledge, laws,
institutions, and, importantly, the political will, to ensure that resource
extraction projects are carried out responsibly, in ways that protect
people and the environment. There are no “silver bullets that enable
countries to avoid the resource curse and make the best possible use
of natural resources for development,”20  nonetheless, there are generally
16 Besada, H. “Doing Business in Fragile States: The Private Sector, Natural
Resources and Conflict in Africa” (Background Research Paper Submitted to
the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (May 2013).
17 UNDP (n. 1).
18 Altman, S., Nichols, S. and Woods, J. “Leveraging High-Value Natural Resources
to Restore the Rule of Law: The Role of the Liberia Forest Initiative in Liberia’s
Transition to Stability.” In P. Lujala and S. A. Rustad (eds.), High-Value Natural
Resources and Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2012: 337-365).
19 Hanlon, J.  “MOZAMBIQUE News Reports and Clippings”, 190 (5 December
2011), see also Hanlon, J. “MOZAMBIQUE News Reports and Clippings”, 187
(23 November 2011).
20 UNDP (n. 1), 2-3.
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steps that nations can take to mitigate the curse.21 The extant literature
is focusing increasingly on capacityin addition to leadership and good
governance as the way to negotiate and transcend the perceived curse.22
In arguing that the resource curse is not, and should not be seen as
immutable, this article also submits that the often one-size-fits-all
solutions that “best practice” approaches engender, need to be
reconsidered.23 Rather, good-fit approaches that acknowledge the
political economy context of a country should be embraced. Adopting
the good-fit approach, will entail “an assessment of each country’s
political economy and institutional environment, including the type of
natural resource available and its spatial distribution; the different
stages of the natural resource value chain; the political, economic and
institutional capability of country; and the different stakeholders
involved.”24
2.  CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IMPERATIVES25
Within the African context, capacity is crucial because it is estimated
that of the continent’s vast resource wealth, only roughly 20 percent
has been exploited.26 This reality, coupled with Africa’s demographic
dividend (notably its youth bulge), deepening political and
macroeconomic reforms, and growing interest in its extractives driven
by demand from the BRICS – notably China and India – have added
21 Hanson et al (n.9), see also Owusu, F., D’Alessandro, C. and Hanson, K.T. “Moving
Africa Beyond the Resource Curse: Defining the “Good Fit: Approach Imperative
in Natural Resource Management and Identifying the Capacity Needs.” In
Hanson et al (n.9), 206-25.
22 Hanson et al (n.9), see also Barma  et al (n.2), Obi (n. 7), UNRISD (n.15).
23 Owusu et al (n.21), see also Barma et al  (n.2).
24 Owusu et al (n.21), 207.
25 Capacity is theorized as “the ability of people, organizations, and society as a
whole to manage their affairs successfully; and is the process by which people,
organizations, and society unleash, strengthen, create, adapt, and maintain
capacity over time. Capacity is also better conceptualized when answering the
question: capacity for what? [and] is most tangibly and effectively developed in
the context of specific development objectives such as [service delivery] …;
empowering local communities to better participate in public decision making
processes; and promoting peace and resolving conflict” (ACBF 2011:30-31).
26 Collier, P. The Plundered Planet: Why We Must – and How We Can – Manage
Nature for Global Prosperity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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27 Hanson et al (n.9), see also Hanson, K.T., D’Alessandro, C., and Owusu, F. “Toward
a Coordinated Approach to Natural Resource Management in Africa.” In Hanson
et al (n.9), 1-14; Le Billon, P. and Levin, E. “Building Peace with Conflict
Diamonds? Merging Security and Development in Sierra Leone’s Diamond
Sector” (2009). Development and Change, 40, 4, 693-715; Maconachie, R.
“Diamonds, governance and ‘local’ development in post-conflict Sierra Leone:
Lessons for artisanal and small-scale mining in sub-Saharan Africa?” (2009)
Resources Policy, 34, 1-2, 71-79.
28 Davies, M. “What China’s economic shift means for Africa” (World Economic
Forum Report, 2015). <http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/03/what-
the-shift-in-chinas-economy-means-for-africa> accessed January 22, 2016.
29 Torchia, A. and French, D. “Oil’s Plunge to Siphon Gulf Petrodollars from Global
Markets.” Reuters Article (19 Jan. 2015). <http://www. reuters.com/article/
mideast-petrodollars-investment-idUSL6N0UE0ZI20150119> accessed
January 21, 2016.
implications.27 The presence of these major global players in the
extractive sector not only brought large investments in the form of
various infrastructural projects in recent years to the continent, but
also led to strong price increases of extractives (at least up until the
recent macroeconomic slow-down in China) reinforcing Africa’s
commodity dependence – or at the very least a distraction – for African
policy-makers to accelerate their efforts towards diversification.28
Noteworthy is the growing interest and investments in the
hydrocarbon and mineral sector from the Gulf, and to a lesser extent,
the demand from the MINT nations.Over the past decade, there has
been a marked increase in petrodollar investments from Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries into Africa in the energy sector.
Simultaneously, GCC countries have stepped up their importation of
minerals from Africa (EIU 2011; UNCTAD 2014). The trend is generally
expected to continueas the GCC forges ahead with its diversification
strategy away from oil and into petrochemicals and other downstream
manufacturing, but on a reduced scale due to the current global
downturn in oil prices.29
Capacity issues such as undercapitalization, lack of competition,
underperformance, investor-friendly and overgenerous legal framework,
inadequate understanding of the technical aspects of natural resource
management (NRM), and the domination of multinational corporations
vis-à-vis a weak state are key obstacles to the transformation of Africa’s
natural resources into a blessing. The effectiveness of all policies to
manage the risks associated with natural resources requires a strong
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30 Ross, M. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” 2001. World Politics, 53, April, 325-
361, see also, Rosser, A. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature
Survey (2006), (Brighton: IDS (Working Paper No. 268); Rosser, A. “Escaping
the Resource Curse” (2006). New Political Economy, 11, 4: 557-570.
31 IMF (International Monetary Fund). “IMF Launches Trust Fund to Help Countries
Manage Their Natural Resource Wealth” (Press Release No. 10/497, 16
December 2010) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/
pr10497.htm> accessed September 26, 2015.
32 AU/UNECA. Illicit Financial Flow: Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial
Flows from Africa (2014). <http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/
PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf> accessed 21 January 2016.
33 Ayee, J.R.A., Soreide, T., Shukla, G.P. and Minh Le, T. Political Economy of the
Mining Sector in Ghana (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, July
WPS5730, 2011:1-48), see also Gboyega, A., Soreide, T., Minh Le, T. and Shukla,
G.P. “The Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria” (2011) World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, August, WPS5779: 1-48; and UNECA.
African Governance Report II (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
institutional framework and the literature is clear that institutional
weaknesses (corruption, lack of rule of law, weak governance) are major
determinantsof the resource curse.30 According to the IMF,” countries
endowed with oil, gas and minerals face great policy challenges [partly
because] national administrations are often weak, laws and regulations
defective, and policies inadequate. Moreover, the overall governance
environment is often poor. As a result, countries often do not receive
fair compensation for their resources, and their spending does not
produce the desired results.”31 Across Africa, the exploitation and
governance of extractive resources (oil, gas and minerals such as copper,
gold, coal, etc.) have, unfortunately, been central to the geo-political,
social, and armed struggles. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia,
Sierra Leone, the Niger Delta in Nigeria and South Sudan immediately
come to mind.Poor governance and weak regulatory frameworks also
are central to the scourge of illicit financial flows.32
A number of capacity challenges have been identified across
resource-rich Africa. The capacity of the legislature to act as a
countervailing force over the executive and understand the complexity
of natural resource legislation has been flagged.33 Aside from passing
the annual budget, the legislature is responsible for ratification of natural
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34 Ayee, J.R.A. “The status of natural resource management in Africa: Capacity
development challenges and opportunities,” In Hanson et al. (eds.) Managing
Africa’s Natural Resources: Capacities for Development (Houndmills, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
35 Ayee, J.R.A. (n.34), see also Ayee  et al (n.33) and Gboyega et al (n.33).
36 AfDB (African Development Bank). African Development Report 2005: Public
Sector Management in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
37 Brautigam, D. “State Capacity and Effective Governance” in (eds.), B.J. Ndulu
and N. van de Walle, Agenda for Africa’s Economic Renewal (New Brunswick/
Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1996: 81-108).
resource leases, contracts, and stabilization agreements.34 Observably,
the performance of these responsibilities is generally subject to executive
influence; thus, the checks and balances intended to secure independent
control by the legislature in some African countries are rendered
dysfunctional. Natural resources leases and other agreements with the
companies first are brought to parliament (the legislature) to be ratified
and then awarded to those companies. In most African countries, a
select committee of the legislature on natural resources is responsible
for conducting due diligence and examining the capacity, reputation,
and finances of the company under review.
In a functioning system, if the company is deemed trustworthy
and the proposal is in order, the contract or the agreement is cleared.
Due precaution is supposed to be taken to avoid conflict of interest
within the legislative select committee. If any matter under
consideration before the committee could cause conflict of interest,
these members have to recluse themselves. This may happen in practice
as well, but this is uncertain because the supervision by the legislatures
and their committees in Africa is not effective.35
Again, weak bureaucratic capacity prevents regulatory institutions
from performing their functions effectively.36 That said, the lack of
capacity is a function of the lack of political incentives to meaningfully
invest in sector reforms rather than a quantitative indicator of a
government’s scarce human and material resources. Tackling poor
regulatory capacity in this arena has not been a consistent priority. As
Brautigam37 points out, central to the challenge is the “nature of African
political regimes” often characterized by politics of patronage. As long
as the leadership continues to engage in “arbitrary policy decisions
not based on a careful analysis and rule mainly through patrimonial
ties rather than rational legal norms, there will be little demand at the
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38 Ibid. 89.
39 UNDP (n.1).
40 Transfer pricing refers to the setting of the price for goods and services sold
between controlled (or related) legal entities within an enterprise. For more,
see for example KPMG (2014) <https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/global-transfer-pricing-review/
Documents/gtpr-2014-full-report.pdf>
41 Africa Progress Panel. Africa Progress Report 2013. Equity in Extractives.




top for analytical capacity, technical skills, and good management in
public administration.”38 As a result, the natural resources industry is
not being regulated effectively, essential analyses are not being
undertaken, and most policy proposals are accepted without sufficient
understanding of their implications. Following from this, capacity is
lacking in the implementation of policies, programmes, and projects.39
Transfer pricing40 is yet another pressing challenge that has
negatively affected revenue collections in some African countries. Most
MNCs in the natural resources sector operate internationally and have
extended dealings with affiliated companies, which increases
opportunities for transfer pricing and potentially lowers the tax liability.
This complicates the task of tax administration and creates a challenge
that requires serious attending to.41 Africa, it is estimated, lost
approximately US$850 billion in illicit financial flows (IFFs) between
1970 and 2008, and over US$1 trillion in IFFs over the last 50 years –
a figure roughly comparable to the development assistance that the
continent received during the same period.
The AU/UNECA42 define illicit financial flows as “money that is
illegally earned, transferred or utilized,” and that typically originates
from one of three sources: (1) commercial tax evasion, trade mis-
invoicing and abusive transfer pricing;(2) criminal activities, including
the drug trade, human trafficking, illegal arms dealing, and smuggling
of contraband; and (3) bribery and theft by corrupt government
officials.43 Many African tax laws have legal provisions meant to address
the challenge, however these provisions are insufficient. The tax
administration personnel need better training on how to recognize
the transfer pricing opportunities in natural resources operations and
stronger capacity to detect and respond to this problem. Failure to
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44 Brautigam, D., Fjeldstad, O-H. and Moore, M. (eds.) Taxation and State-Building
in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008).
45 ACBF (n.9).
46 WTO. World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources (Geneva: World
Trade Organization, 2010), see also Gaille, S. “Mitigating the Resource Curse: A
Proposal for Microfinance and Educational Lending Royalty Law” (2011), Energy
Law Journal, 32: 81-96.
47 ALSF. 2014 African Legal Support Facility Annual Report (Abidjan: African Legal
Support Facility, 2015), see also Botchway, F. N. and Rukuba-Ngaiza, N. “The
Constitutional Regime for Resource Governance in Africa: The Difficult March
toward Accountability”, in (eds.) J. Wouters, A. Ninio, T. Doherty, and H. Cisse.
Improving Delivery in Development: The Role of Voice, Social Contract and
Accountability (World Bank Legal Review Vol. 6, 2015). Washington, DC: World
Bank: 149-170.
48 Obi (n.7).
grasp its sophisticated and complex nature will seriously erode the tax
base in most African countries.44 Yet another area that urgently needs
attention is the generous concession that governments grant to MNCs
in the natural resources sector and which cannot be altered even when
the conditions in which they were signed have change substantially or
unexpectedly ex post.45 Consequently, attempts at contract
renegotiation have not only been contentious but have reflected
institutions’ weak capacity to engage MNCs meaningfully, particularly
in the face of the resources at their disposal.46 Countries that have
recently renegotiated extractive contractssuccessfully, some with the
expert assistance of the African Legal Support Facility of the AfDB),
include DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Tanzania, and Zambia.47
Then again, governments’ capacity to address the domestic side of
natural resource governance – for example, effective distribution or
use of the revenue generated from natural resources to prevent conflict
– has been an issue. Good resource management involves accountability
on how these resources and wealth are used. Good resource
management ensures that everyone benefits from the resource wealth
in a fair and equitable manner. Unfortunately, across Africa, resources
have been a blessing for a few and a curse for many – the latter often
being the population and the localities from where resources are
extracted.48 This problem can be attributed to poor resource manage-
132 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 1: 2017
49 Onigbinde, D. Natural Resource Management and its Implications on National
and Sub-regional Security: The Case of the Niger Delta (2008). Kofi Annan
International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) (Occasional Paper No.
22: 1-23).
50 Ikelegbe, A. “The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of
Nigeria” (2006). African and Asian Studies, 5, 1:23-55; see also Obi (n.7).
51 Onigbinde (n.49).
52 Hayes, K. and Perks, R. “Women in the Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Sector
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” In: P. Lujala and S. A. Rustad (eds.)
High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2012).
53 Benkenstein, A. “Artisan and Small-scale Mining in Africa: Opportunities and
Challenges” (SAIIA Blog, 1 March 2012). Johannesburg: South African Institute
for International Affairs. Accessed January 24, 2016.
54 Hayes, K. and Perks, R. (n.52).
ment, a problem in many resource-rich countries in Africa.49 A good
example is the Niger-Delta region, Nigeria’s largest oil producing region
but the poorest because it has not benefited from the oil wealth derived
from oil production.50 Similar cases can be found with oil in Angola
and diamonds in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone,
two countries that have experienced both extreme poverty and violent
civil wars.51
Capacity issues equally plague Africa’s artisanal and small-scale
mining (ASM) sectors.52  ASM activities in Africa are estimated to engage
about 8 million workers, who in turn support about 45 million
dependents.53 Furthermore, the number of ASM miners is growing as
a result of rising commodity prices and limited economic opportunities
in other sectors. In Ghana, for example, ASM contributed nine per
cent of total gold production in 2000, rising to 23 per cent by 2010.
ASM is also a vital livelihood source for women across rural resource-
rich African countries providing impoverished women and families with
economic opportunities that might not otherwise exist.54
Sadly, this aspect of the mining industry across Africa is poorly
carried out due to the weak/non-existent technical capacities required
to identify, plan, develop, and exploit high value resources. As a result,
small-scale stakeholder extractive activities fail to take full advantage
of the overall value of the resource while, at the same time, consuming
or contaminating other resources – such as wood and other forest
resources, land, and water, which are essential to livelihoods and food
security, particularly once the extractable resource is exhausted. Thus,
as currently conducted in many countries, artisanal and small-scale
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55  Ibid.
56 ACBF (n.9).
57 See also Ramdoo and Bilal. 2014. On Beneficiation/Upstream and Downstream
Linkages/The “Smile Curve”, etc.
58 Geda, A. “Resource Flows From Booming Natural Resource/Primary Commodity
Sectors in Africa and Their Macroeconomic Policy and Capacity Building
Challenges” (2012). (ACIR 2013 Background Paper No. 2), Harare: ACBF.
59 Besada, H., Lisk, F. and Martin, P. “Regulating Extraction in Africa: Towards a
Framework for Accountability in the Global South” (2015), Governance in Africa,
2(1): 1-12; see also Barma et al (n.2).
mining delivers short-term monetary gains to miners and traders who
are involved directly, but it also worsens local poverty for many others.
In the DRC, artisanal and small-scale mining has been linked to armed
conflict where minerals extracted by artisanal workers were used to
purchase weapons and fund other aspects of the conflict.55
To further highlight the urgency of capacity for natural resources
management, consider that even though oil, gas and metals are of
strategic importance, they do not even account for 5 percent of total
global production of goods and services, making the importance of
Africa’s raw materials relative.56 While there may be substantial natural
resources reserves in Africa, in most cases, the heart of usage – especially
in the extractive industries, lies outside Africa. Despite Africa being
top in the production of diamonds, gold, cobalt and platinum, it is
obvious that most of these minerals are exported in their raw form to
developed economies and to emerging economies.57 Even where
resource-rich African states try to generate revenue via exports, this
effort is still insignificant.58 Foreign markets, be it the traditional
Western nations or increasingly emerging economies such as the MINTs/
BRICS/GCC, still unduly determine the path of Africa’s economic growth
and development irrespective of the natural resource endowments,
due to the structural dependency of African economies on natural
resources in its raw/unprocessed form.
The aforementioned suggests several policy actions. For one, the
existing human, institutional and infrastructural capacity deficiency
must be sufficiently addressed.59 There is the need also for technical
capacity to independently explore known and unknown natural resource
deposits, independently appraise finds and properly evaluate their
worth, assess investor work plans so as to maximize the real rate of
recovery and return from natural resources, and several other technical
functions.Africa’s think-tanks could lead this effort. African nations
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dependent on resource exploitation also need to particularly be capable
of securing political and social stability. This calls for leadership capacity
to develop strong policy instruments including, but not limited to,
clear and well-conceived regulations and mining codes to manage the
inflows of foreign direct investments (FDI). Such capabilities also
include how a country manages at different levels – local, country, or
regional level – to aggregate and address citizen needs, include diverse
societies in decision-making (women and excluded groups), and
enhance accountability of public officials to the citizenry. If countries
are unable to secure social and political stability, and they are rich in
natural resources, they remain poor and mired in conflict.60 The conflicts
in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s, the crises in Nigeria’s Niger
Delta region, and the ongoing strife in the eastern parts of the DRC are
reflective of this.61
Yet another key capability is that of tapping benefits from trade
and integration which presupposes the capacity to put in place an
enabling environment with property rights, rule-based governance, a
sound business regulatory environment, a functioning financial sector
and effective trade policies.62 Countries also need to have skills to
negotiate, discuss and secure the appropriate terms of trade, trade
policies, and engage in fair contractual agreements.63 Efforts by post-
civil war Liberia, and Mozambique in the timber industry, Sierra Leone
in the minerals sector, and the AfDB’s African Legal Support Facility
60 Ismail, O. and Okeke, J.M. “Criminality in the Natural Resource Management
Value/Supply Chain.” In Hanson et al (eds.) Managing Africa’s Natural Resources:
Capacities for Development (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
61 NATO. “Global dynamics of national security: alliances and resources – The
future of resource conflicts: The Africa pattern. NATO” (2012). <http://
www.libraryindex.com/pages/1941/Global-Dynamics-National-Security-
A l l i ances -Resources -FUTURE-RESOURCE-CONFLICTS-AFRICA-
PATTERN.html> accessed February 10 2015; see alsoRustad, S. A. and
Binningsbø, H. M. Rapid recurrence: Natural resources, armed conflict and peace.
Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (Working Paper, Center for the Study of
Civil War, 2010).
62 Rustad, S., Lujala, P. and Le Billon, P. “Building or Spoiling Peace? Lessons from
the Management of High-Value Natural Resources.” In P. Lujala, and S. A. Rustad
(eds.), High-value natural resources and peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2012:
570-621).
63 Ibid.
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(ALSF)64 assisting countries’ negotiation of extractives contracts are
all steps in the right direction.65 That said, there is a high need for
management capacity to remove constraints that bottleneck the
effective extraction of resources, notably supply chain bottlenecks
(transport logistics, business climate).
Again, having the requisite capacities to track the impact of different
economic policies, particularly those that help countries manage the
boom and bust cycles inherent in dependency on natural resources, is
also required.66 Such capabilities include having a cadre of individuals
and institutions that can formulate, implement, and evaluate
macroeconomic, fiscal, and debt policies. Citizens also expect that a
country rich in natural resources should be able to deliver services
effectively, which presumes a quality public administration, efficient
resource mobilization, and superior budget and financial management
capabilities. Price fluctuations and changes in terms of trade also
necessitate critical capabilities of managing within uncertainties, and
being ready for the emerging challenges such as climate change. Such
uncertainties require countries to have skilled people, well versed in
sustainability thinking for development programmes and policies and
institutions for environmental sustainability.67
Last but not least, effective management capacity to negotiate the
dynamic interactions between large-scale mining companies and the
local/indigenous artisanal and small-scale mining sector are critical for
building domestic legitimacy for resource extraction and for reducing
potential sources of conflicts over resource extraction.68 Managing the
relationship must be premised on a tacit recognition that small/
artisanal mining has a legitimate and significant role to play in the
64 The ALSF is an independent international African institution established in
2008 to provide legal advice and technical assistance to African countries in
matters pertaining to creditor litigation and complex commercial transactions.
ALSF assists countries in acquiring effective legal assistance in dealing with
vulture fund negotiations and litigation, and accessorily acquiring the requisite
legal capacity on a reimbursable fee-basis to negotiate complex commercial
transaction. For more, kindly see: alsf@afdb.org.
65 Hanson et al (n. 90), see also Barma et al (n.2).
66 ACBF (n. 9) see also Geda (n. 58).
67 Hanson, K. and Léautier, F. A. “Enhancing Institutional Leadership in African
Universities: Lessons from ACBF’s Interventions” (2011). World Journal of
Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development, 7(2/3/4): 386-
417.
68 Owusu et al (n.21).
136 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 1: 2017
socio-economic development of African countries. It must also
acknowledge their potential competition for the same mineralization,
impacts on livelihoods if access to resources is limited, and changing
social conditions, including conflict between artisanal/small mining,
locals, and large-scale mining companies. Some large-scale mining
operations have recently published a set of approaches and tools for
mining companies to engage with artisanal/small mining.69 A key aspect
of the guidance is that all International Council on Mining and Metals
(ICMM) members will implement the Sustainable Development
Framework, report their performance against the 10 principles in
accordance with GRI guidelines, and offer third-party verification that
companies are meeting their commitments to the 10 principles. While
this is a good start, governments must take this to the next level by
addressing some of the demands of artisanal mining in their specific
national contexts.
3.  NEW DISPENSATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA
Studies suggest that a wave of new optimism is sweeping across Africa
– rising GDP, consumer spending increases, and returns on investments
are higher than global averages.70 Recent publications all highlight an
evolving natural resource landscape in Africa.71 RWI,72 for instance,
notes that Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, South Sudan, and Zambia have all
recently reformed their oil or mining legislation to include some
principles of open government (e.g., all public data are made available
[Open], and available to anyone [non-discriminatory]). Similarly, the
growing exposure of the problem of “missing revenues” and growth of
corporate social responsibility programmes, extensive and participatory
discussions of value chains and jobs, development of trust funds/
69 See ICMM. 2010. “Working Together:How large-scale mining can engage with
artisanal and small-scale miners.” <http://www.icmm.com/page/17638/new-
publication-on-engaging-with-artisanal-and-small-scale-miners> accessed on
8 February 2015.
70 McKinsey Global Institute. Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of
African Economies (2010). McKinsey Global Institute <www.mckinsey.com/
mgi>.
71 Hanson et al (n. 9), see also ACBF (n.9), Africa Progress Panel (n.41), Revenue
Watch Institute. The 2013 Resource Governance Index (RWI, 2013).
72 RWI (n.71).
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sovereign wealth funds (Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania), and the
increasing mobilization of community interests (Ghana, Nigeria), and
community-based NRM are all images of this evolving landscape.73
Another manifestation of the changing landscape is the African Mining
Vision (AMV), which was adopted by African Heads of States and
Governments in February 2009.74
Even as initiatives such as the EITI, Publish What You Pay (PWYP),
and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) continue to
monitor resource extraction activities, UNEPS International Resource
Panel (IRP) is steadily building up an understanding of global resource
flows and why economic growth needs to be decoupled from rates of
resource extraction. However, for the aforementioned initiatives, and
others such as the Natural Resource Charter (NRC) (www.natural
resourcecharter.org) and AMV to really benefit Africans as a whole,
there is the “need for greater ownership and buy-in by African citizens
… and greater policy space for [countries] to regulate and monitor
resource extraction for the benefit of their populations.”75
The apparent damaging situation of resource-rich economies in
Africa is not immutable.76 Many agree that better governance,
transparency and accountability are central to good resource manage-
ment,77 and can help enhance the potential value of natural resource
endowments.78 Studies suggest that the legacy of oldnatural resource
management landscape, characterized by asymmetries of weak states
versus strong external actors (MNCs, consumer countries); low and
often erratic commodity prices; unfair terms of trade; low technological
and managerial capacity; insufficient and ineffective legal frameworks
and policies; weak bargaining capacity and systems of taxation; lack of
transparency and accountability across the value-chain; windfall rents,
73 ACBF (n. 9).
74 ECA/AU (Economic Commission on Africa/African Union Commission).
Economic Report on Africa 2013: Making the Most of Africa’s Commodities:
Industrializing for Growth, Jobs and Economic Transformation (Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia: ECA/AU, 2013).
75 Africa-Canada Forum. The African Mining Vision: A Transformative Agenda for
Development (2013). <http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/working_ groups/2013-
04-02-AMV_backgrounder_EN.pdf> accessed October 4, 2015.
76 ACBF (n. 9), see also Obi (n. 7).
77 NRC (The Natural Resource Charter). Natural Resource Charter (November,
2010). <www.naturalresourcecharter.org> accessed October 3, 2015.
78 Collier (n.26).
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when realized, extracted for benefit of only the elite; lack of economic
diversification and shared growth; unmitigated environmental damage
caused by extraction process; and the socio-cultural displacement of
affected communities is giving way to an evolving positive landscape.79
Today, internal and external pressures have resulted in a growing
state coherence with strong policy frameworks and increased regional
and sub-regional integration and linkages. Recent developments at
enhanced cooperation in the East African Community, or among
stakeholders along the Maputo Corridor, are good examples. This,
coupled with high, if still erratic, commodity prices on Africa’s
extractives, driven by a strong demand from BRICs; advancements in
technical skills (law, science, management); a recognition of need for
training programmes; extensive discussion of value chains and jobs;
development of trust funds/SWFs; the promotion of green growth,
REDD+(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation), national and international NGOs environmental
advocacy; a proliferation of CSOs with increased capacity and
international linkages; and new configurations of dialogue (among
public, private, NGOs, and communities), have contributed to the
increased rejection of blood diamonds, conflict timber, abuses of MNC
oil and gas extraction; even as national governments advance  initiatives
such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Africa Mining
Vision (AMV), African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC),80 and
AfDB’s African Legal Support Facility.81
The entire portfolio of stakeholders is subject to a new normative
environment, as evidenced by the strong natural resource management
policy environment emerging across Africa.82 Policies frame the sphere
of potential constructive action; there are now new spaces for agency.
The increases in the global prices of extractives over the past decade,
79 Barma  et al (n.2).
80 The AMDC was launched in December 2013 to strategically coordinate the
implementation of the African Mining Vision (AMV). Amongst others the AMDC
coordinates the provision of technical support for the implementation of the
AMV, identifies gaps and areas of need and potential expertise to address those
needs, undertakes/coordinates policy research, undertakes advocacy and
information dissemination, monitoring and evaluating activities relating to the
implementation of the AMV, and provides a think tank capacity for the AMV and
the activities around it. Visit http://www.uneca.org/amdc for more on AMDC.
81 Hanson et al (n.9).
82 RWI (n.71).
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coupled with the expansion of new discoveries, and a growing demand
from emerging economies, for a while represented an unparalleled
opportunity for Africa’s resource-rich states to bolster transformation
within the ongoing evolving landscape. However, the recent global
downturn in oil prices, and the slow-down in China, has drastically
affected markets and investments in the industry.83 Enhancing the
investment climate is one of the central steps to advancing international
competitiveness in Africa’s resource-rich economies.84 Countries need
to advance and entrench policies that acknowledge the realities of their
national contexts, that can bring about rapid results in a context of
urgent need, and that allow for incremental improvements to their
governance processes.85
The ongoing developments are in the right direction, however,
resource-rich African states need to embrace policies and initiatives
that aim to sustain the current momentum. As Page86 points out, much
of Africa’s post-1995 growth acceleration has been primarily driven by
“avoiding the policy mistakes that led sharp economic contractions in
the past and by a strong surge in growth in the resource-rich economies.”
To sustain and enhance the gains already achieved, resource-rich African
states must also seek creative ways (such as institutionalized peer-to-
peer learning programmes, and knowledge management systems) to
overcome the knowledge asymmetries that they face in negotiations
with foreign stakeholders; even as they develop appropriate tax
structures, and invest in advancing capacity in all sectors along the
entire natural resources value-chain.87
In Ghana, for example, Tullow Oil Plc in collaboration with the
British Council in Accra, launched the Tullow Group Scholarship Scheme
to provide annual scholarships to 50 Ghanaians to pursue postgraduate
83 England, A. “African Growth Feels the Strain from China’s Slowdown.” Financial
Times (27 October 2015). <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ef4d851a-7bc5-11e5-
98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#axzz3yBPBF4iz> accessed 24 January 2016.
84 Page, J. “Rowing Against the Current: The Diversification Challenge in Africa’s
Resource-Rich Economies” (2008). Global Economy & Development Working
Paper 29. Washington, DC: Brookings.
85 Marcel, V. Guidelines for Good Governance in Emerging Oil and Gas Producers
(September 2013). London: Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International
Affairs).
86 Page (n.84).
87 Marcel (n.85), see also RWI (n. 71), ECA/AU (n. 74).
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programmes abroad. In Botswana the opening of the Debswana
complex, representing a fifty-fifty joint venture between De Beers and
Botswana, including a US$35 million state-of-the-art diamond sorting,
valuing, and selling centre, called DTC Botswana, has contributed to
the skills development of locals in the diamond industry – sorting, and
valuing gems which previously was done outside the country. Ensuring
that Africa’s natural resource endowments translate into meaningful
development, will also require building meaningful partnerships based
on trust, mutual interests, and common understanding of challenges,
opportunities and possibilities.88
As Marcel89 also notes, “instead of encouraging [African countries]
to pursue “best practice” standards, it may be more helpful to advise
them to aim for more appropriate practice, which acknowledges the
realities of the national context,more effective practice which seeks to
bring about rapid results in the context or urgent needs, or better
practice, which aims at incremental improvements of governance
processes through aspirational, but achievable, milestones.” Marcel,
thus, concurs with Barma  et al,90 and Owusu et al,91  who all call for a
good-fit approach to natural resource management in Africa.
4.  GOOD-FIT APPROACH TO RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
The recognition of the centrality of national political and economic
context in resource management has led to calls to de-emphasize the
so-called best practices and promote good-fit policies in resource-rich
African countries.92 Proponents of the good-fit policies argue that
welfare-promoting policies, institutions, and governance must be
tailored, at least in part, to suit each country’s specific context.93
88 Lisk, F., Besada, H. and Martin, P. “Regulating Extraction in the Global South:
Towards a Framework for Accountability” (2013). Background Research Paper,
Submitted to the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda
(May).
89 Marcel (n.85).
90 Barma  et al (n.2).
91 Owusu  et al (n.21).
92 Ibid.
93 Diamond L. and Mosbacher, J. “Petroleum to the People: Africa’s Coming Resource
Curse – and How to Avoid It”, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2013).
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139647/larry-diamond-and-jack-
mosbacher/petroleum-to-the-people>  accessed 7 September 2015.
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According to Barma,94 policies will be effective in leveraging natural
resource-led development only when such policies are compatible with
the level of institutional quality and the political economy context of
the country in question. Accordingly, designing natural resource
management policies for any country should be preceded by an
assessment of that country’s political economy and institutional
environment as it relates to natural resource management and, on
that basis, develop a “set of targeted prescriptions across the natural
resource value chain that are technically sound and compatible with
the identified underlying incentives.”95 Much like the other proponents
of the institutional explanation, Barma et al96 not only make a case for
good-fit policies for resource-rich African countries, but also go a step
further and argue that identifying what are the good-fit policies requires
a good understanding of the national context.97
Given that countries face different hurdles as they proceed along
the natural resource value chain,98 including their ability to include
the dynamic feedback loops in their decision making process,good-fit
approaches must acknowledge the enormous variations among the
resource-endowed African countries in terms of the political and
economic conditions, institutional quality, and capacities.99 For instance,
the natural resource management challenge will vary for fragile/failed
states such as South Sudan, for post-conflict states such as Sierra Leone,
as well as for stable states such as Botswana.100 Accordingly, the capacity
needs and sequencing of such needs will vary and must be recognized
as such. Doing so, helps reinforce the call for good-fit policies, with
tailor-made solutions/strategies, based on the assessment of the
country’s political economy. Depending on country-specific contexts,
it may be appropriate in one stead to pursue institutional capacity
development first, as opposed to individuals. In other situations, it
94 Barma et al (n.2).
95 Ibid., 3.
96 Ibid.
97 Owusu et al (n.21).
98 The NRM value chain spans the key sequence of steps that a resource-dependent
country must undertake in transforming its natural resource into developmental
aspiration. These include sector organization and contract awards, regulation
and monitoring operations, collection of taxes and royalties, revenue distribution
and management, sound and sustainable policies (ACBF 2013).
99 Besada (n.16).
100 ACBF (n.9).
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will be better to invest first in the capacity of the legislature, as opposed
to say the capacity of the government or civil society.101
Implementing the good-fit approach thus entails tailoring
interventions to the national context and developing an incentive
structure that supports and nudges stakeholders into making
developmentally oriented decisions. The importance of governance,
leadership, and stakeholder’ engagement in this effort cannot be
overemphasized.102 However, an understanding of the roles and
capacities of the various stakeholders and a renegotiation of their
mandates with an eye toward more interdependence, coordination,
and mutual monitoring must herald the good-fit approach.103
An anticipated change that will result from the good-fit approach
involves governance arrangements that stress the role of civil society.
As local communities increasingly assert their voice in negotiations of
resource exploration, especially in the extractive sector, civil societies
have emerged as crucial governance actors, demanding a greater share
of benefits for the long-term development of the local communities
and increased their involvement in decision-making in natural resource
management.104 The extractive industry developer’s embrace of Social
License to Operate (SLO), local content strategies and the desire to
manage the relationship between local and large-scale miners are
examples of how African governments can help chart out alternative
natural resource governance that are more reflective of each nation’s
context, as well as avoiding potentially costly conflicts and exposure
to social risks.105 SLO is becoming increasingly relevant for mining
companies due to their ability to ensure that local stakeholders remain
supportive of projects.
Another tactic being usedby some African countries to wade off
101 Ibid.
102 Puplampu (n. 11).
103 Owusu et al (n.21).
104 Greenspan, E. “Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in Africa: An Emerging
Standard for Extractive Industry Projects” (2014). Oxfam America Research
Backgrounder Series <www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/fpic-in-africa>,
see also Owusu (n. 21), and Lujala, P. and Rustad, S. (eds.) High-Value Natural
Resources and Peacebuilding (London: Earthscan, 2012).
105 Prno, J. and D. Scott Slocombe. “Exploring the Origins of ‘Social License to
Operate in the Mining Sector: Perspectives from governance and Sustainability
theories” (2012). Resources Policy, Vol. 37: 346-367, see also Pike, R. “The
Relevance of Social License to Operate for Mining Companies” (Schroders
Social License to Operate Research Paper, July 2012).
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local discontent is the introduction of requirements for local content106
into their regulatory frameworks.107 Successful local content
programmes such as CDC Development Solutions in Angola108 or the
Minerals and Mining Act (2006)/the Minerals and Mining (General
Regulation 2012) (LI 2173) of Ghana require good and clear
understanding of the business benefits and a well-defined strategic
plan adapted to the country’s situation. Hence, a nuanced appreciation
of the local context is vital for effective SLOs in terms of requirements,
capabilities, and the barriers that limit local worker and local company
participation. These factors will vary by location, nature and stage of
project life cycle.
5.  CONCLUSION
Africa is at a crossroads in terms of growth, development, governance,
and sustainability.109 Available evidence suggests that Africa is evolving
a new, more complex, evidence-based, participatory, and coordinated
vision of natural resource management: a vision of natural resource-
based development motivated by an increasingly diversified and
empowered portfolio of stakeholders and actors – indigenous groups/
communities, civil society, media, governments, multi-national
corporations, and private investors.
A broad capacity development of all actors (i.e., investors, civil
society, locals, and government) is desirable, and gradually pursued
by countries across the region, although it is usually unrealistic in the
time frame of resource exploitation priorities and processes, and in
106 Local content refers to strategies to ensure that outputs from the extractive
industry sector generate further benefits to the local economy beyond the
direct contribution of its value-added, through its links to other sectors (Tordo
and Anouti, 2013). The requirements for local content strategy include creating
jobs, promoting enterprise development, and accelerating the transfer of skills
and technologies (IPIECA 2011).
107 IPIECA. Local Content Strategy: A Guidance Document for the Oil and Gas
Industry (London, UK: IPIECA, 2011).
108 Levett, M. and Chandler, A.E.  Maximizing Development of Local Content Across
Industry Sectors in Emerging Markets (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 2012).
109 Hanson, K., G. Kararach and T. Shaw (eds.) Rethinking Development Challenges
for Public Policy: Insights from Contemporary Africa (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012).
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particular given the other needs that prevail in the African context.
The essential things, therefore, are the focused approaches needed to
attend to near-term capacity problems, while simultaneously pursuing
deeper institutional capacity development. One practical approach in
acute settings is to enhance the capacities of opposed sets of actors to
act as checks on one another. The UN has done considerable work on
the problem of capacity imbalance/sequencing, particularly in the
context of peace negotiations. Its experiences can be applied widely
for the benefit of all resource-rich, but often capacity-poor African
countries to enable them advance good-fit approaches, and thereby
negotiate/transcend the perceived resource curse. In addition, African
countries need to draw on the experiences and lessons of nations (both
in the global North and South) that have successfully managed natural
resource endowments to spur development and prosperity. To this end,
insights from Norway, Chile, Vietnam, and Botswana could provide
valuable learning for African nations.
The winds of change sweeping the continent need to be sustained,
and to do so will require the active engagement of all stakeholders in
the natural resource value chain – communities, civil society, media,
governments, multinational corporations, Africa’s regional and
continental bodies, as well as development partners. It also calls for
leadership capacity, functional institutions and a sustained drive to
seek out good-fit policies that advance institutions and governance
system tailored, at least in part, to suit each country’s specific context.
